“Supreme Court Decision Threatens Clean Air and Clean Water for All,” said the Environmental Defense Fund in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 28 decision in the Loper Bright v. Raimondo case.

The Sierra Club decried the Loper Bright ruling for “gutting federal environmental protections,” predicting it “could send a ‘convulsive shock’ to decades of federal environmental, financial, and health-care regulations.”

What did the court do to provoke such a hyperbolic response?

The landmark 6-3 decision did not gut any protections, nor does it threaten anybody’s water supply. The Supreme Court did overrule the 40-year-old “Chevron deference” doctrine, a precedent that required courts to defer to executive-branch bureaucrats in interpreting vague or unclear laws.

The 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. created a two-step process for courts to review how laws were interpreted. First, courts determined if Congress clearly stated what the law meant. A clearly stated intent required agencies and courts to follow that intent. Ambiguity led to the second step, requiring courts to defer to “reasonable” agency interpretations, even if judges had legal reason to disagree.

The Loper decision eliminated Chevron deference, returning the rulemaking burden to the legislative branch and restoring to courts their constitutional role of interpreting law. But media and environmental activists see darker forces at work.

“Unelected judges,” the Sierra Club warns, lack the relevant expertise to interpret laws that require a nuanced understanding of science or policy. But case law is replete with examples of courts ruling in complex trials that involve intricate scientific or technical expertise. There is no evidence that these unelected judges do any worse than unelected bureaucrats.

Consider a manslaughter case where a determination of guilt or innocence hinges on nuanced forensic evidence. Should the presiding judge simply defer to the “expert opinion” of the state’s Attorney General and forensic experts? Or should a fair trial include expert testimony from all sides, allowing courts to weigh the evidence and make an informed judgment based on the facts presented? If judges are not qualified in these matters, what role would citizen jurors have in complex legal cases? What need is there for juries when courts can quickly and simply defer to agency experts?

The overwrought response to the Loper Bright ruling suggests something deeper than disagreement about the details of the case. National Marine Fisheries Service interpreted a law requiring domestic fishing boats to carry federal monitors as implying an obligation for boat owners to pay the federal monitors’ salaries. It is not unreasonable to wonder whether the clear financial interest of federal employees and agency budgets, as opposed to purely impartial technical expertise, influenced the Fisheries Service’s decision.

But the logic of Chevron deference requires us to assume that dispassionate scientific expertise drives all decisions of agency staff. Behind this is an even more naïve belief that there is some objective good of society known only to Washington bureaucracies.

A Mercatus Center study recently found that the costs and benefits of regulations were quantified only 0.4% of the time. This statistic remained true even when accounting for the generally improved understanding of the costs and benefits associated with environmental regulations versus the low standard required for other regulations — making it hard to argue that judges can’t be trusted with these cases because the details are so complicated. The stark lack of rigorous economic analysis exposes a profound government disregard for accountability and transparency. This is hardly the kind of expertise we can trust to make decisions that impact our lives and livelihoods.

As the illusion of impartial expertise fades, a troubling legal philosophy remains. The essence of the rule of law is to offer clear, objective guidance to ordinary citizens. Separation of powers breaks down when unelected bureaucrats, operating under the guise of impartial expertise, receive unquestioning deference from other branches of government. Under Chevron deference, individual rights and the ability of courts to intervene were left to the mercy of arbitrary bureaucratic discretion.

This legal philosophy finds its roots in the Progressive Era vision that was spearheaded by Woodrow Wilson. Influenced by social Darwinism, Wilson saw government as a living organism. He believed strict rule of law and separation of powers were too rigid, and he favored giving experts discretion to govern without constraints. This approach gave administrative agencies vast power, allowing them to interpret and enforce laws independently.

The Founders supported limited government and checks on executive power because they took a realistic view of human vice and the tendency of powerful people to confuse their own preferences with the public good. The progressives believed something very different: that disinterested agency employees would overlook personal interest and ignore incentives. Accepting this (at best) naïve view allowed a significant shift in American policy toward the bureaucratic model of governance. Chevron deference supercharged the natural tendency of administrative agencies to appropriate power while it hamstrung the courts’ constitutional duty to restrain that power grab.

The decision to overrule Chevron deference will not shrink federal or state bureaucracies, and it probably won’t do much to rein in the regulatory apparatus. But it still stands as a pivotal moment in American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court ruling points to a return to the nation’s origins and expectations for limited government. It highlights the dangers of an ever-expanding administrative state left unchecked by judicial oversight and threatening the foundational principles of American governance.

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